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Abstract 
This paper uses individual worker and municipal information to examine privatization's influence on the wages of 
thirteen occupations. Findings reveal that the group of relatively low-skill content occupations comprising bus drivers 
and construction laborers receive a wage premium in the absence of privatization, and privatization is associated with 
an erosion of this premium. In contrast, the group of relatively high-skill content occupations comprising physicians 
and lawyers receive a non-trivial public sector discount in the absence of privatization and only the wage differential of 
physicians erodes with increased privatization. However, physician's public sector discount does not erode when 
estimating privatization's influence on this occupation's weekly earnings.
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1. Introduction 
 
Contracting-out is a common privatization approach used by municipal governments to 
reduce the cost of providing public services.  This type of privatization relies on competitive 
bidding by private contractors to lower the costs of providing municipal services.  The source of 
cost-savings is derived primarily from contractors’ ability to pay their workers relatively low 
wages (Savas, 1982).   Past research that empirically examines privatization’s wage effect 
focuses on savings associated with declining union rent for highly organized workers employed 
in relatively low-skill content occupations such as refuse removal and public transit 
transportation operatives (Hoover and Peoples, 2003; Peoples, Talley and Wang, 2008).  Their 
findings detect lower wage levels for this group of public sector workers employed in privatized 
municipalities.  However, wage findings on highly organized low-skill content occupations may 
not present a complete assessment of privatization’s wage effect for the entire set of public sector 
occupations.  
The possibility that public-private sector wage differentials vary by occupation has 
significant implications for privatization’s potential to generate labor cost savings. However, to 
our knowledge empirical analysis of privatization’s wage effect across a wide range of 
occupations does not exist.  This study’s contribution to the empirical analysis of privatization’s 
ability to lower labor costs is two-fold. Public-private sector wage differentials are estimated for 
thirteen occupations for individuals residing in localities where municipalities do not contract-
out public services.   These wage estimates for non-privatized municipalities are significant 
because they allow examination of the type of public sector occupations that depict a potential 
source of labor cost savings.  This study also estimates privatization’s effect on the public-
private sector wage differential for these same occupations.  Information from the wage 
differential estimates is significant because it allows for observing whether privatization’s wage 
effect is more prominent for occupations that traditionally pay higher public sector wages 
compared to wages paid in the private sector.   
 
2. Public and Private Sector Wage Differentials 
 
Past research suggests that public sector labor earnings might depict a source of cost 
savings because public sector wages have a tendency to surpass wages paid in the private sector 
(Bender, 1998).  However, not all public sector occupations receive a wage premium over 
workers in the private sector. For instance, occupational level analysis indicates that public-
private sector wage differentials vary across occupations.  The pattern that emerges is a double 
pay imbalance where public sector employees at the low end of the wage distribution are paid 
more than their low end private counterparts.  In contrast, public-sector employees at the high 
end of the wage distribution are paid less than their high end counterparts in the private sector 
(Bender, 2003).   
Public pressure to lower taxes and increasing tax revenue demands from providing public 
services have contributed to policy-makers seeking to eliminate unjustifiably high operating 
costs.  Privatization is a common policy choice for addressing public sector budget pressures.  
On one hand, cost savings may arise due to the enhanced competition between public and private 
service providers and this competition has the potential to mitigate the double pay imbalance 
wage pattern.  On the other hand, public-private wage differentials may still persist even when 
municipalities privatize.  Highly organized public sector workers can impose restrictions that 
force contract workers to adhere to public sector pay scales as a requirement for receiving a   2
contract award (Talley, 1998).  Such action would contribute to highly organized public sector 
workers in low-skill content occupations maintaining wage levels above levels set in the private 
sector and reducing the cost advantage of contracting to private sector contractors.  Private sector 
wage advantages for high-skill content occupations can persist even if municipalities use public 
sector pay scales as a benchmark to negotiate lower local labor market wages.  Private sector 
employers may not have the latitude to lower wages of workers in high-skill content occupations 
if such wages are set competitively in the private market.  In sum, privatization’s wage effect is 
not obvious a priori, and requires empirical analysis to test whether contracting-out creates a 
business environment that lowers public-private sector wage differentials. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Approach 
 
Two data sources reporting municipality and individual worker information are used to 
examine privatization’s influence on occupational wages.  Municipality information is taken 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1999 Census of Government.  This source 
includes contracting-out privatization information on public services at the township level.   
Township municipalities contracting-out to workers in the private sector are identified by 
assigning a value of one for the privatized service.  Municipalities employing their own in-house 
employees are assigned a value of zero. This township information is used to construct an 
aggregate measure of privatization, such that it is identified as a weighted percentage of 
privatized townships within a metropolitan area.
1   
    Individual worker information is taken from 1997-2002 Current Population Survey-
Outgoing Rotation Group files (CPS-ORG).
2  Individual worker information is merged with the 
BEA file by using local residency identifiers.  The CPS uses 4-digit metropolitan statistical area 
(msa) codes, while the BEA uses its own coding system for townships.  Codes are matched using 
the Census Bureau’s Government Integrated Directory to convert township BEA codes to census 
msa codes. Occupations with relatively large sample sizes of individuals reporting the public 
sector as their employing industry are selected for wage analysis. Imposing this sample selection 
criteria results in the compilation of information for 13 occupations.   
This study estimates separate wage equations for the 13 occupational groups to examine 
public-private sector wage patterns. The wage equation is specified as follows: 
 
Ln(wage) j = 0 +1Z j  +2public j + 3privatization j + 4(public x privatization) j  + 
5time +   j                            (1)  
 
where ‘j’ indexes individual workers.  The dependent variable is log of hourly wage imputed 
from an individual’s weekly earnings and weekly hours worked.  While using hourly wages as a 
dependent variable is appropriate for measuring labor earnings for most occupations examined in 
this study, for high-skill salaried occupations such as lawyers and physicians, the imputed hourly 
wage may be inaccurate due to the likely measurement error for weekly hours worked for these 
jobs.  Hence, an additional set of labor earnings equations are estimated using the log of weekly 
earnings as the dependent variable for the sample of high-skilled salaried occupations. The 
                                                 
1 Township population sizes are used as weights when computing this measure of privatization. 
 
2 1997 and 2002 CPS information is pooled to construct a sample population that is large enough to examine wage 
patterns for a broad range of occupations.    3
variables of interest for this study are public, privatization, and their interaction term.  The 
variable public is an individual worker’s public or private employee status dummy.  It takes on 
the value one if the individual works for the local governments, and has a value of zero if the 
individual works in the private sector.
   The variable privatization  is a continuous variable 
measuring the share of townships that provide privatized municipal services.  The matrix Z 
consists of a set of control variables identifying individual workers’ profile and residency status. 
These explanatory variables include residency dummies for US geographic quadrants, and urban 
residency status.  The worker profile measures are dummies depicting individual workers’ 
marital, sex, fulltime, union, ethnicity and educational attainment status, as well as age and age 
squared.  Last, since the data covers six years, five time dummies identifying the sample 
observation period are included in the matrix time.  Its inclusion addresses the possibility of a 
fixed-effect for wages over time. 
 
4. Wage Findings 
 
Public-private sector wage differentials derived from estimating this study’s wage equation 
are presented in Table 1.
3 The first column of this table reports the public-private sector wage 
differential for workers residing in non-privatized locations.  This wage differential is calculated 
using the estimated coefficient β2.
4  Column (2) presents the estimated coefficient β3, which 
measures the change in private sector wages attributable to a one percentage point change in 
privatization. Last, Column (3) presents the estimated coefficient β4, which measures 
privatization’s additional effect on the wages of workers in the public sector. 
The first set of results listed in Table 1 is those for workers providing health care 
services.  These wage findings present evidence suggesting a double pay imbalance wage pattern 
for workers employed in non-privatized locations.  For instance, the findings in column (1) 
reveal that for non-privatized localities, public sector workers employed in the high-wage high-
skilled occupation of physicians receive a non-trivial hourly wage discount of 23.33 percent.  In 
contrast, workers employed in the comparatively less high-skilled content occupation of health 
care technicians receive a non-trivial premium of 14.75 percent if they reside in non-privatized 
localities. The other non-physician occupations listed in Table 1 are also able to avoid receiving 
a pubic sector wage discount as their wages closely resemble wages paid in the private sector.  
Physicians in the private sector receive smaller premiums due to privatization as the results 
presented in column (3) indicate that their wage advantage declines by 0.39 percentage points for 
each percentage point increased in privatization.  Health care technician is the only other health 
care occupation listed in Table 1 to experience a substantial marginal privatization effect on 
public sector wages.  The findings in column (3) indicate that a one percentage point increase in 
privatization is associated with a 0.19 percentage point reduction of the public-private sector 
wage differential for health care technicians.   
Wage results for workers providing construction services are listed as the second set of 
occupations in Table 1.  These findings suggest that other than plumbers there is a lack of a 
public-private sector wage differential for construction workers. Apparently, privatization does 
not impose an appreciably large effect on the wages of non-laborers in construction as the wage 
results in columns (2) and (3) are not statistically significant for this group of workers.  In 
                                                 
3 Complete results including control variables are available from the authors upon request. 
 
4 The estimated coefficient 2 is converted to a percentage wage differential by using the formula (e
2 -1)100.   4
contrast, findings in column (2) indicate that laborers employed in the private sector experience a 
0.09 percentage point increase in wages with a one percentage point increase in privatization.  
Findings in column (3) reveal that privation is associated with a statistically significant erosion 
of laborers small public sector premium.  
Wage results for workers employed in law enforcement or clerical occupations are listed 
as the third set of occupations.  The findings for these occupations provide some evidence 
suggesting a double pay imbalance wage pattern for workers employed in non-privatized 
locations.  The contents of column (1) indicate a large and statistically significant public sector 
wage discount of 16.34 percent for lawyers, which is a high educational requirement occupation.  
In contrast, the findings for the comparatively low-skill content secretary and receptionist 
occupations indicate a non-significant public-private employee wage differential.  Findings in 
column (2) show that of the three occupations in this group privatization is associated with a 
statistically significant wage reduction for lawyers employed in the private sector.  Column (3) 
shows that privatization reduces the public sector wage discount for lawyers and receptionist.  
However, the wage reduction is only significant for receptionists.  
Wage results for workers providing transportation services are listed as the last set of 
occupations in Table 1.  These findings reveal evidence that does not contradict the notion of 
double pay imbalance.  The two occupations examined in this group are bus and truck drivers.  
The job responsibilities do not require substantial schooling and are hence considered low-skill 
content occupations. Findings in column (1) indicate a large and statistically significant public 
sector wage premium of 15.48   percent for bus drivers residing in non-privatized metropolitan 
locations.  Truck drivers’ wages match that of their counterparts in the private sector.  The 
contents of column (3) show that privatization is associated with a declining public-private wage 
differential for bus drivers. However, this decline is not statistically significant.   
Additional earnings estimates for the sample of high-skilled salaried occupations are 
presented in Table 2. These results report the estimated public-private sector weekly earnings 
differentials for workers employed as physicians or lawyers.  The overall earnings differential 
pattern mirrors the hourly wage findings reported in Table 1.  However, there are some notable 
differences when comparing hourly and weekly earnings results for these two occupations.  For 
instance, findings in column 1 of Table 2 reveal a measurably larger public sector weekly 
earnings discount for both occupations compared to their hourly wage results.  In addition, the 
weekly earnings results for lawyers in column (3) also differ appreciably from their hourly wage 
results.  The weekly earnings findings in column (3) indicate that privatization’s earnings effect 
is not statistically significant, whereas privatization’s effect is significant when estimating hourly 
wages for lawyers.  
 
Table 1: Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials Derived from Estimating Equation (1) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Occupation    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4). 
 
Health Care Professions 
Physicians      -23.33%**  -0.11%***  0.39%**  89/2154 
Registered nurses        1.91     0.04***   0.005    425/8347 
Licensed practical nurses   -0.32   -0.28   -0.01   62/1264 
Health care technicians    14.75**   0.02    -0.19**   105/2336 
 
Construction Occupations   5
Construction supervisor    2.16   0.02   -0.14   137/1727 
Electricians    -0.72   0.03     0.16   72/2208 
Plumbers      -15.72*   0.04   -0.05   74/1550 
Construction  laborer 4.35   0.09**   -0.21**   193/3455 
 
Law and Clerical Occupations 
  Lawyers      -16.34***  -0.17*   0.15   338/2856 
Secretaries      -1.07     0.04**   0.04   163/2185 
Receptionists   -8.99   -0.01   0.23**   57/2101 
 
Transportation Occupations 
  Bus  driver      15.48*   -0.02   -0.05   307/996 
Truck  driver     -1.85   0.07**   -0.08   256/1821 
 
Table 2: Public-Private Sector Earnings Differentials for High Skill Occupations 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Occupation    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4). 
 
 
Physicians     -28.46%***  -0.09%**  0.17%   89/2154 
  Lawyers     -23.85%***  -0.19%**  0.14%   338/2856 
 
 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Column (1) reports public-private sector wage differentials in non-privatized locations (2). 
Column (2) reports the change in private sector wage due to a one percentage point change in 
privatization (3). 
Column (3) reports privatization’s additional effect on public sector wages (4). 




Findings from this study are interpreted as suggesting that privatization can generate direct 
labor cost savings when municipalities contract out services provided by low-skill content 
occupations comprising construction laborers and bus drivers.  Large savings from lower wages 
for low-skill content workers, though, aren’t guaranteed as public sector bus drivers are able to 
avoid a significant wage reduction when faced with privatization.  Wage findings for high-skill 
content occupations comprising physicians and lawyers are interpreted as suggesting that 
municipalities are able to avoid high labor costs associated with a private sector wage premium 
when contracting-out work for services provided by highly trained workers.  Last, excluding 
wage findings on health care technicians and plumbers, findings on the remaining occupations 
are interpreted as suggesting that for the majority of occupations municipalities generally pay 
economically justifiable wages that closely resemble wages charged in the private sector. Even 
the wage findings for health care technicians and plumbers suggest municipalities engaging in 
cost saving measures as public sector health care wage premiums decline with privatization and 
public sector plumber wage discounts do not change with privatization. 
   6
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